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Abstract

The U.S. Government has looked for effective ways of reducing acquisition cost
and schedule overruns for decades. The task of isolating the root cause of these overruns
has been difficult. Consequently, it has been difficult for the Government to create
effective policies that prevent overruns from recurring. In 1998, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) undertook this problem, and looked to successful DOD and
commercial companies for solutions. They found that using mature technology, having
complete product designs, and having production processes under control was critical to
successfully developing new products. The GAO combined these concepts into a single
acquisition practice that they call a Knowledge-Based Approach. They postulate that
programs that adhere to the Knowledge-Based Approach will experience better program
outcomes than programs that do not. This thesis validates the GAO’s claim by
comparing the outcomes of programs that met the Knowledge-Based Approach criteria
with those that did not. Our findings suggest that the GAO’s claim is accurate. While
their approach may not be a single means for success, programs that employed their
approach generally performed better. The programs that met the GAO’s criteria
experienced a smaller variation of outcomes and appeared less likely to spiral out of
control.
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BEST PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT ACQUISITION:
A TEST OF THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE’S KNOWLEDGEBASED ACQUISITION THEORY

I: Introduction

Introduction
The U.S. Government has searched for effective ways of reducing its acquisition
cost and schedule overruns for decades (Deloitte Consulting LLP, 2008; Hanks,
Axelband, Lindsay, Malik, & Steele, 2005; GAO, 2002). Acquisition reform efforts have
been around for decades, yet acquisition program outcomes have improved very little
(Friedman, 2009; Hanks, Axelband, Lindsay, Malik, & Steele, 2005). The
ineffectiveness of current acquisition practices is a challenge, and has limited the DOD’s
ability to supply the warfighter with systems on time and on cost (Shimel, 2008). Poor
acquisition program outcomes have become notorious throughout the DOD, as they have
become a hindrance to the acquisition customer, as well as to internal and external
acquisition stakeholders. Deloitte Consulting conducted a survey of government and
Aerospace & Defense executives regarding program execution problems. Deloitte found
that over 43% of government and Aerospace & Defense executives polled thought that
program execution problems were as serious as the current housing and banking crisis
(Deloitte Consulting LLP, 2008, p. 1). Additionally, because of Congress’s concern with
program performance, Congress has established mandatory reporting requirements for
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those programs in which unit cost has exceeded 15 percent of the originally planned cost
(Shimel, 2008).
The DOD acquisition portfolio is enormous, containing 96 major programs valued
at approximately $1.6 Trillion in 2008. Further, the cost growth of these programs in
2008 was valued at $296 Billion and the average program was 22 months behind
schedule (GAO, 2009, p. 7). On average, cost and schedule overruns have been
increasing by roughly 1.86 percent annually and it has been estimated that they will
increase from the already high rate of 25 percent in 2009, to over 46 percent by 2018
(Deloitte Consulting LLP, 2008, p. 2; GAO, 2009).
In 2009, the VH-71 program experienced a unit cost growth of fifty percent from
its estimate in 2006, and it cut its production quantity in half (Fein, 2009; GAO, 2009).
The VH-71 program’s overrun was a Nunn-McCurdy Breach, wherein the Secretary of
Defense must certify that the program meets several requirements in order to keep the
program “alive” (BNA Federal Contracts Daily, 2007). The user will receive half the
units they expected and will pay more for them. This is not atypical, programs like the
C-130 Avionics program, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile, the Land Warrior, and the Warfighter Information Network all suffered
Nunn-McCurdy breaches due to unit cost growth of more than 25% of their current
baseline or 50% over the Approved Program Baseline (BNA Federal Contracts Daily,
2007). Clearly, a need exists for more effective acquisition practices to improve this
trend and help programs stay within cost and schedule estimates.
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The Current Acquisition Movement
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force published the Acquisition
Improvement Plan in 2009. Their focus was on recapturing acquisition excellence by
establishing an acquisition framework that instilled rigor, reliability, and transparency in
the acquisition system. The Acquisition Improvement Plan required the use of
incremental acquisition strategies that reduced cost, schedule, and technical risk, while
producing operational capabilities early (Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force, 2009). Lastly, the plan sought to “implement means to increase cost estimating
confidence levels and establish more realistic program budgets (Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force, 2009).” We suspect that the Government Accountability
Office’s (GAO) Knowledge-Based Approach was influential in the creation of these
goals. The GAO’s Knowledge-Based Approach centers on the concept that programs can
achieve better results by reducing their technology risk early in the program lifecycle.
Thus, the GAO’s approach should be an effective way for programs to achieve the
challenging demands of the Acquisition Improvement Plan.

The GAO Studied Best Practices
The GAO conducted an in-depth study of the best practices used by DOD and
Commercial industry and then used their findings to develop the Knowledge-Based
Approach. Their goal was to help program managers achieve better program outcomes
by leveraging the acquisition community’s best practices (GAO, 1998). The GAO
acquired these best practices through interviews of what they considered the best DOD
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and commercial companies with regard to developing and manufacturing new products
(GAO, 1998). The GAO found that an important characteristic of successful commercial
and DOD organizations was that they had attained essential knowledge of their programs
at or before critical points in their new-product development processes. These programs
had mature technology prior to program initiation, they had complete product designs
prior to their product design review, and they had their production processes under
control before beginning production.
Consequently, the GAO recommended that the DOD adopt these practices
through an approach the GAO calls the Knowledge-Based Approach. The GAO believes
that this approach will help DOD programs achieve better program outcomes based on
the GAO’s extensive study of new-product development best practices (GAO, 1998;
GAO, 2002). This approach has been instrumental to the success of commercial firms
like Boeing, Chrysler Corporation, Cummins Engine Company, Ford Motor Company,
Honda Motor Company, and Hughes Space and Communications, all considered among
the best organizations in developing new products (GAO, 1998, p. 3).

Follow-up Assessments
The GAO collected program performance data on major acquisition programs as a
follow-up to their original study. Each program was chosen because of its high dollar
value, acquisition stage, or because it had attracted congressional interest (GAO, 2008).
The data sources included the Selected Acquisition Reports and the Defense Acquisition
Management Information Retrieval Purview system, which provided the financial,
schedule, and quantity information for each program. Additionally, the GAO used
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questionnaires and interviews to gather information about program office staffing,
program requirement changes, and other program aspects (GAO, 2009). The GAO has
presented their audit findings annually, beginning in 2003, in GAO reports titled
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. As we will discuss, these reports were the
basis of our analyses.

Purpose of This Study
The objective of our study was to test the GAO’s Knowledge-Based Approach
(hereafter termed the Knowledge-Based Acquisition Theory (KAT)), to determine if
programs that met the KAT criteria performed better than those that did not. By testing
the KAT, we felt we would better understand the relationship between the KAT and
program performance, thus giving additional credence to the GAO’s methodology. Our
test focused on the following research question:
Research Question:
Do defense acquisition programs that adhere to the GAO’s Knowledge-Based
Approach perform* better than programs that do not?
*Performance measured using cost, schedule and quantity variables.
This study will contribute to the “Acquisition Community of Practice” (Defense
Acquisition University). Our results will provide program managers with a better
understanding of the implications of their decisions regarding the GAO’s KnowledgeBased Approach. Furthermore, isolation of the factors most critical to program success

15

will help decision makers better understand the trade space surrounding their decisions,
as well as better understand the potential consequences of their decisions.

Figure 1: Knowledge Assessment for Weapon System Programs in 2008

(GAO, 2008)

The GAO’s Knowledge-Based Approach seems to be a logical approach to
obtaining better program results. However, in 2008, the GAO reported that none of the
programs they assessed at Milestone C (Production Start) had achieved the respective
Knowledge-Based Approach criteria, and that 88 percent of programs were initiated
(Development Start) without mature technology (Figure 1). We anticipate that our
findings will confirm the GAO’s claim that programs that adhere to the KnowledgeBased Approach will experience better outcomes, and that our findings will encourage
program managers to adopt the GAO’s Knowledge-Based Approach.
We organized the remainder of this document as follows: Chapter II provides an
in depth look at the Knowledge-Based Acquisition Theory as well as a historical glance
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at previous acquisition reform efforts. In Chapter III, we explain our data source and the
variables we used for our analysis. We also explain the methods we used to test our
hypotheses. In Chapter IV, we describe the results of our analysis. Lastly, in Chapter V
we summarize the results and suggest the policy and procedure implications of our
results.
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II: Literature Review

Introduction
Over the past twenty-five years, acquisition reform initiatives have focused on
ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of acquisitions, so that the Department
of Defense (DOD) can reduce cost and schedule overruns (Hanks, Axelband, Lindsay,
Malik, & Steele, 2005; Christensen, Searle, & Vickery, 1999). The GAO has offered its
Knowledge-Based Approach as an effective way for the DOD to improve acquisition
program outcomes, based on the results of GAO’s study of best practices within DOD
and industry (GAO, 1998). Although the GAO’s approach has influenced the
Acquisition Improvement Plan, the GAO’s approach has not been readily adopted, and
the management and execution problems have become "too big to ignore” (Deloitte
Consulting LLP, 2008).
Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs continue to have cost and
schedule overruns (GAO, 2002, p. 2; Deloitte Consulting LLP, 2008; Schwartz, 2009).
These overruns reduce the DOD’s buying power and reduce the funding available for
other DOD priorities (GAO, 2008, p. 5; Gansler, 1989, p. 170). Overruns are not new to
DOD acquisitions. However, overruns are often viewed as singular events, rather than
systemic ones (Shimel, 2008). Further, cost and schedule growth has invoked concern
from both Congress and the American public in the DOD’s ability to meet the urgent and
growing needs of the warfighter (GAO, 2005; Schwartz, 2009). In 2009, the DOD
acquisition portfolio was valued at $1.6 Trillion, and the portfolio had accumulated an
estimated $296 Billion in program cost growth (GAO, 2009). This cost growth is
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equivalent to the pay and expenses of all members of the armed services for two years
(111-23, 2009, p. 12). These persistent cost and schedule overruns make it hard for the
DOD to accurately forecast its financial requirements and have been the catalyst
motivating the DOD and Congress to pursue more efficient acquisition practices. (GAO,
2009, p. 9)

Background
Congress and the DOD have looked for ways to improve the acquisition process
for decades (Christensen, Searle, & Vickery, 1999; Hanks, Axelband, Lindsay, Malik, &
Steele, 2005; The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986).
Each increment of change that has been implemented has attempted to make DOD
acquisitions a more efficient and effective process. However, the reform initiatives from
the 1960s to the 1990s brought little improvement to the effectiveness of the system as
indicated by a consistent cost growth of approximately twenty percent throughout that
period (Christensen, Searle, & Vickery, 1999, p. 4). During the 1980’s, reform initiatives
focused on fraud, waste, and abuse. However, the focus changed in the late 1980’s when
it became apparent that the cost of fraud, waste, and abuse was inconsequential compared
to the cost of the heavily legislated procurement process (Hanks, Axelband, Lindsay,
Malik, & Steele, 2005).
Consequently, in 1986 President Reagan initiated significant changes to the
acquisition process. At that time, the overall sentiment toward DOD acquisitions was
that the DOD needed to become more “responsive, effective, and efficient” in its

19

acquisition practices (Hanks, Axelband, Lindsay, Malik, & Steele, 2005). Consequently,
President Reagan appointed Mr. David Packard to direct the “Presidents Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management” in 1985. The Packard Commission spent a year
studying ways in which the DOD could improve its management through an in depth
look at both government and commercial companies that produced similar products to
those produced in the DOD. The commission focused on the underlying business models
of successful companies to see what models they could use as a foundation for an
improved DOD acquisition model. As we will discuss later, the approach taken by the
GAO in 1998 was very similar to the approach taken by the Packard Commission in
1986.
The Packard Commission found that the DOD needed to reduce the “red tape”
that was restricting its employees from being efficient. They also found that the current
process was “inflexible,” and that the legislation was often the cause of the waste it aimed
to eliminate (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986). As
a result, their efforts aimed at reducing the “bureaucratic inefficiencies” found in the
system by consolidating acquisition legislation and streamlining the process (President’s
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986).
In addition to finding ways to streamline the process, the 1986 Packard
Commission examined how technology push and user pull could have specific
implications on government acquisitions (The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management, 1986). As they described, a user pull situation occurs when users
assess their current capabilities and then request new assets to fill any capability
deficiencies (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986). It is
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an effective approach in terms of keeping the requirements generation process
requirements driven since the users are generating requirements based on current needs,
and not on a desire to have a “new” technology. Unfortunately, the typical user is
unfamiliar with the technology development process and usually has only a limited
understanding of the implications of their “requests” (President’s Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management, 1986). A technology push situation occurs when
new technologies are “sold” to users. Users then generate requirements based around the
new concepts. As we will discuss later, the GAO’s KAT recommends that new product
development requests originate from user-defined (“user pulled”) capability gaps and that
the acquisition community fill gaps using existing, mature, technologies (GAO, 1998, pp.
24-25)

Post 1986 Packard Commission Reform
For more than a decade following the 1986 Packard commission, acquisition
reform focused on ways to achieve quicker, more efficient processes. Throughout the
1990’s the DOD implemented over sixty acquisition reform initiatives focusing on
“faster, better, and cheaper” acquisitions (Hanks, Axelband, Lindsay, Malik, & Steele,
2005) . These initiatives focused on helping the DOD expedite its acquisition processes
and allow it to take an aggressive approach to new product development. These changes
included streamlining the acquisition hierarchy, applying “off-the-shelf” components to
new products, and using cost and performance tradeoff studies when determining
program requirements (Templin & Christensen). However, the reform initiatives in the
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1990’s also led to a significant reduction in the size of the government acquisition
workforce, and in turn led to an increase in outsourcing (Thomas, 2008).
After 2001, the reform focused primarily on improving accountability and
oversight (Hanks, Axelband, Lindsay, Malik, & Steele, 2005). In addition, current
reform has placed the burden of program performance on the program manager (Hanks,
Axelband, Lindsay, Malik, & Steele, 2005, p. 17). Managing a program is a daunting
task during a time when much of the program execution responsibility rests with the
major defense contractors (Deloitte Consulting LLP, 2008, p. 16). Defense contractors
are making important decisions regarding system requirements and design, and in many
cases, defense contractors decide who will be developing system subcomponents (GAO,
2005). This environment can add risk to DOD acquisition programs if not properly
managed (Hillson, 2004, p. 13).

GAO’s KAT
The GAO has recommended that the DOD implement a Knowledge-Based
Acquisition approach since 1998. In 1998 and again in 2002, the GAO testified before
Congress that their research showed that commercial industry had achieved better newproduct development outcomes by developing products using only proven technology,
completed product designs, and by having their production processes under statistical
control (GAO, 1998; GAO, 2002). However, over the past ten years, program managers
have not fully adopted the GAO’s guidance into their decision making process based on
the results of the GAO’s surveys (GAO, 2009). Why? Has the “persistent nature of
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acquisition problems” overwhelmed decision makers, making them complacent (GAO,
2005)? Is the DOD so unique as to be unable to achieve results similar to successful
commercial firms?

DOD versus Commercial Industry
There is a significant difference between the DOD’s pursuit of new-product
development versus that of the commercial sector. One such difference is the amount of
responsibility each program manager has for program outcomes. Program managers in
the companies the GAO visited were incentivized to be realistic about their ability to
meet their program goals since these managers were likely to stay with a program from
concept to production (GAO, 2000, p. 1). As a result, commercial program managers are
probably less likely to be overly optimistic about their program metrics.
Department of Defense program managers have short tenures relative to their
commercial counterparts. The program manager who establishes the initial cost and
schedule expectations is usually not accountable for achieving those expectations (GAO,
2000, p. 9; Deloitte Consulting LLP, 2008). This environment holds managers
accountable to near term program issues, but they are less accountable for the long-term
viability of their programs. We do not suggest that government managers are dishonest,
merely that they are incentivized to be more focused on the near term aspects of the
program and less on the long-term impacts of their decisions.
Furthermore, it is likely that a commercial manager’s promotion potential is tied
more to the successes and failures of the programs they have managed than is the
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promotion potential of a DOD manager. As a result, the commercial program manager is
less likely to take on undue risk or attempt to inflate the reputation of their programs
(GAO, 2002, pp. 3-10; GAO, 2000, p. 6). On the other hand, DOD program managers
promotion opportunities are often tied less to the long-term performance of their program
and more to its performance during their tenure (GAO, 2000, pp. 2-3). Department of
Defense program managers typically change many times throughout the life of the
program making it hard to associate any single success or failure to a specific individual.
Additionally, a DOD program manager is motivated to obtain funding each year,
and to be an advocate for their program and the user (GAO, 2000, p. 3; Deloitte
Consulting LLP, 2008, pp. 15-16). Managers’ incentives are to take on risk, and to
pursue an aggressive budget, schedule, and performance goal. The importance of this is
that a commercial program manager may view the Knowledge-Based Approach as an
appropriate way to ensure successful outcomes, while a DOD program manager may see
the Knowledge-Based Approach as a hindrance that slows down the pace of his or her
program.
In addition to having different incentives for their managers, DOD and
commercial firms pursue new product development for different reasons. The DOD’s
mission, to supply national defense, requires that it constantly develop new products for
use in maintaining its military supremacy. The DOD does not seek to profit like
commercial business; however, it is motivated to minimize cost because of congressional
pressure and a limited budget. Commercial firms are motivated by profit generation,
which also demands that they limit their costs in order to be successful. Consequently,
commercial firms initiate new product development only when a solid business case
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exists, or a market need exists. Commercial firms initiate new product development
when they are certain they can produce a product in a relatively short time period and
when the technology needed for the product has already been demonstrated (GAO, 1998,
pp. 5-7; GAO, 2000, p. 4). Therefore, while the incentive structure and reasons are
different, the DOD and Commercial Industry both seek to minimize the cost and time
needed to produce a new product.

GAO’s Knowledge-Based Acquisition Theory
Our analysis focused on testing the assumptions of the GAO’s Knowledge-Based
Acquisition Theory (KAT). In 1998, at the behest of Congress, the GAO studied whether
or not “commercial practices offer ways to improve DOD’s process for transitioning
weapons from development to production (GAO, 1998).” The subsequent GAO report
focused on three things. First, it compared DOD’s practices for preparing a weapon
system for production and the best practices used by commercial firms for similar
projects. Second, it examined how the environments that the DOD and commercial firms
operate in affect their new product development practices. Lastly, the report discussed
environmental changes that the GAO considered “key to the success of DOD initiatives
for improving the transition of weapons from development to production” (GAO, 1998).
The purpose of GAO’s study was to help the DOD find effective ways of expediting
acquisition schedules and to help programs become more effective (GAO, 1998). The
GAO wanted to help find a way for the DOD to get product development results similar
to those found in industry.
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There is a significant difference between the DOD and commercial sectors
management of the technology used in their new-product development (GAO, 1998, p.
12). Commercial companies make a distinction between technology development and
product development; they keep the two activities independent of one another (GAO,
1998, p. 12). Commercial new-product development includes designing and
manufacturing of a particular product that meets the needs of a particular market.

Figure 2: Achieved Technology Development (GAO, 1998)

Conversely, new-technology development, independent of new-product
development, looks to advance current technology so that it will be available for use in
future products. Commercial firms separate technology and new product development
because they view technology development as volatile and risky, and they expect it will
require a lot of rework (GAO, 1998, pp. 12-14; GAO, 2000, p. 4). In the DOD,
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technology development and product development typically occur in unison as part of
one acquisition strategy; the technology that is developed focuses on a specific need for a
specific product. The DOD takes on the risk inherent in new technology development
during new product development.
Figure two shows how differently commercial firms and the DOD approach
technology development completion (Knowledge Point 1) with respect to new product
development (program launch). The commercial firms have completed technology
development prior to new-product development, whereas the DOD will continue to
develop its technology well into production (GAO, 1998, pp. 14,22; GAO, 2005, p. 7).
Commercial practices may not be readily adaptable to the DOD’s acquisition
environment. Unlike commercial organizations, the DOD develops cutting-edge
products that test the limits of technology so that it can maintain military supremacy.
Further, because the DOD already has “first-class” products in its inventory, new
products must be even more advanced than the current inventory to be developed
(Friedman, 2009). Nevertheless, if the DOD seeks program outcomes that are similar to
those found in successful commercial firms, it may benefit from studying their methods.
The GAO’s Knowledge-Based Approach derived from their research of successful
commercial firm practices.

Knowledge Point 1: Mature Technology
The GAO’s knowledge point one is synonymous with Milestone B for DOD
programs, and it is the first of the three KAT criteria that the GAO expects will lead to
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“better weapon system outcomes” (GAO, 1998). A product must have obtained a
technology readiness level of seven (TRL7) at or before KP1 in order to meet the GAO’s
best practice standard. In other words, a product’s technology must work in its intended
operational environment (see appendix for complete TRL definitions). This is different
from current DOD practices, as current policy requires programs to have met TRL6.
Technology Readiness Level 6 demonstrates technology maturity at the subcomponent
level, not the integrated system (USD(AT&L), 2008).
According to the GAO, successful commercial firms match mature technology
with system requirements at KP1 and then proceed to produce the new product.
Successful commercial firms do not usually develop a new technology for a new product
since technology development is expensive and time consuming. Instead, they design
new products around pre-existing and mature technology (GAO, 1998).
In 2006, Congress required that Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs)
demonstrate TRL6 prior to obtaining milestone B approval (Office of Air Force Lessons
Learned (HQ USAF/A9L), 2009). This requirement is similar to the recommendation
made by the GAO; however, the difference between TRL 6 and TRL 7 is significant.
According to the GAO, TRL 7 “represents a major step up from TRL 6,” as it signifies
that the prototype works in an operational environment on an actual system (GAO-09326SP). The standard for TRL 6 is that a prototype works in a realistic environment such
as a “high fidelity lab” or a “simulated realistic environment” (GAO-09-326SP).
Similarly, The Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook states that
technology should be proven in either a relevant or an operational environment before a
program can proceed into system development (DUSD(S&T), 2005). Furthermore, the
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Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (DUSD S&T)
defines technology readiness assessments, as a “systematic, metrics-based process and
accompanying report that assesses the maturity of certain technologies [ ] used in
systems” (DUSD(S&T), 2005, pp. 1-2). The requirement listed in the TRA Deskbook is
that assessments occur for each increment of the system under the principles of
evolutionary acquisition strategy. In addition, it suggests that acquisition programs
should deliver timely capability to the warfighter even if it requires producing an asset
that meets only part of the user’s need. The user should resist the urge to demand design
solutions that require high-risk requirements (Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force, 2009). We designed our first hypothesis to test the validity of the assumptions
surrounding Knowledge Point 1 (Figure 3).

Hypothesis 1: Defense acquisition programs that do not reach Technology
Readiness Level 7 (TRL7) by program initiation (Milestone B) will experience
worse program outcomes than defense acquisition programs that do reach TRL7
by program initiation.

Knowledge Point 2: Product Design
The second criteria a program must meet to experience better outcomes is
Knowledge Point Two, KP2. This Knowledge Point is based on the idea that mature
product design will reduce program uncertainty and in turn, increase program success.
The GAO reported in 1998 that successful commercial firms had a good understanding of
their product’s design (90% of Engineering Drawings Complete). Additionally, they
posited that a program manager conveys confidence in a product’s ability to perform, and
the maturity level of the product, by releasing the design drawings to the manufacturer
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(GAO, 1998). These design drawings communicate the details of the product and the
materials used, as well as how the products piece/parts performed during testing. The
heuristic used by both DOD and industry is that the product’s design is essentially
complete when roughly 90 percent of the engineering drawings are complete. The
percent of drawings complete is determined at the Critical Design Review for DOD
programs. In 2002, the GAO reiterated, “the most problematic programs…started
production before design and manufacturing development work was concluded” (GAO,
2002, p. 24). However, currently the majority of programs do not achieve KP2 on time.
We developed our second hypothesis to test the validity of the assumptions surrounding
KP2 (Figure 3).

Hypothesis 2: Defense acquisition programs that do not complete 90% of their
engineering drawings by Critical Design Review will experience worse program
outcomes than defense acquisition programs that do complete 90% of their
engineering drawings by Critical Design Review.

Knowledge Point 3: Production Maturity
Knowledge Point Three (KP3) is the third component that the GAO found critical
to the success of commercial firms. To meet KP3 criteria a program’s production
processes must be under “statistical” control (GAO, 2002, p. 13). The leading
commercial companies the GAO visited knew that they could produce their products
within their quality constraints before they began producing production articles (GAO,
1998). These firms had production processes within statistical control, meaning they
were able to produce them within acceptable deviation tolerances. According to the
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GAO, programs should meet KP3 criteria at or prior to the start of production (Milestone
C). Currently, the DOD does not require programs to have production processes within
statistical control at the Milestone C decision. Production Qualification does not occur
until after the Milestone C decision.
Maintaining consistency during the production phase is critical because deviations
and defects found after manufacturing a product will cause rework and can increase the
cost of each unit. The GAO’s KP3 measurement provides an assessment of the
manufacturer’s production ability, and meeting it should help prevent rework associated
with production process issues. Additionally, since DOD products are manufactured
externally, program managers can use KP3 to monitor the progress of the contractor and
subcontractor. We designed our final hypothesis to test the validity of the assumptions
surrounding KP3 (Figure 3).

Hypothesis 3: Defense acquisition programs that do not have manufacturing
processes stabilized by Milestone C will experience worse program outcomes
than defense acquisition programs that do have their manufacturing processes
stabilized by Milestone C.

Figure 3: Knowledge Point Schedule
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Current Acquisition Reform
In late 2005, the GAO conveyed its continuing concerns about the DOD’s
management of its investment portfolio to the U.S. Senate. The GAO’s concern was that
acquisition program cost increases, combined with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
will prohibit the military from delivering assets essential to the warfighter (GAO, 2005).
Further, they said that the DOD knows what to do to garner more successful acquisition
outcomes but that it is not implementing the controls necessary to initiate the change
(GAO, 2005). In addition, the GAO was concerned that the typical margin of error in
percentage terms will equate to significant cost overruns as the acquisition portfolio
grows in value. According to GAO, in a mere five years (2001 to 2006) the Total Cost of
the DOD’s top five acquisition programs grew from $291 Billion Dollars to
approximately $550 Billion Dollars as shown in their table, reproduced below (Table 1).

Table 1: Total Cost of DOD's Top 5 Programs (FY06 Dollars)

2001

2006

Program

Cost

Program

Cost

F/A-22 Raptor Aircraft
DDG-51 class destroyer ship
Virginia class submarine
C-17 Globemaster airlift
aircraft
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
fighter Aircraft
Total

$65.0 billion
$64.4 billion
$62.1 billion
$51.1 billion

Joint Strike Fighter
Future Combat Systems
Virginia class submarine
DDG-51 class destroyer ship

$206.3 billion
$127.5 billion
$80.4 billion
$70.4 billion

$48.2 billion

F/A-22 Raptor aircraft

$65.4 billion

$290.8 billion

Total

$550.0 billion

(Adapted from (GAO, 2005, p. 3))
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Weapon System Reform Act of 2009
GAO’s KAT has influenced the acquisition community for the past ten years, most
recently affecting the policy enacted in the 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform
Act (111-23, 2009). Recent changes in DOD acquisitions essentially direct the DOD
acquisition community to implement the KAT approach. On May 22, 2009 the 111th
Congress passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 - Public Law 11123, to improve the DOD acquisition environment. This Act specifically prescribes
changes to acquisitions through three general categories: (1) The Acquisition
Organization, (2) Acquisition Policy, and (3) Additional Acquisition Provisions. This
Reform Act seems to be consistent with the GAO’s KAT, it generally supported the
GAO’s claim that following the KAT would produce better program outcomes.
First, Section 103 of the Act, Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analysis
for Major Defense Acquisition Programs, states that the Secretary of Defense must
designate a senior official who will conduct performance assessments and root cause
analysis for MDAPs ( (111-23, 2009)). In other words, they will investigate MDAPs that
miss one or more key performance parameters to determine why they missed the
parameter. The person in this position will be responsible for the performance
assessments of MDAPs on a periodic and an as needed basis. They will conduct root
cause analyses of MDAPs as well as issue the policy and guidance needed to govern the
process of performing these root cause analyses. This analysis should yield an evaluation
of the usefulness of the current metrics used to assess program performance and,
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recommend any necessary changes to the metrics. Lastly, this position will advise
acquisition officials on potential program performance issues.
Again, the purpose of the Root Cause Analysis is to assess the underlying cause
of a programs inability to meet one or more key performance parameters (PL111-13).
The parameters include cost, schedule, and performance as well as the following eight
additional parameters:
I.
II.

Unrealistic performance expectations
Unrealistic baseline estimates for cost or schedule

III.

Immature Technology or excessive manufacturing or integration risk

IV.

Changes in Procurement Quantities

V.
VI.

Inadequate program funding or funding Instability
Poor Performance by Government or Contractor Personnel responsible for
program management

VII.

Any other Matters
Of particular significance in the context of this study, is item III from the list,

Immature Technology or excessive manufacturing or integration risk. The 2009 GAO
report found that of the 39 programs that provided them with data only 14 had, or would
have, mature technology at or prior to Milestone B (GAO 2009, pg 16). We expect that if
having mature technology at MSB does provide better program outcomes then the root
cause analysis will substantiate the GAO’s claim.
Section 104 of Public Law 111-23 requires the Directors of Defense Research and
Engineering and Developmental Test and Evaluation to submit a report of technology
maturity and integration risk to the Secretary of Defense annually. This change is
consistent with the GAO’s KAT, specifically KP1 (technology maturity level). This
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section requires that the Director of Defense Research and Engineering develop and
publish knowledge-based technology maturity standards for MDAPs. It requires that
technology maturity assessments occur at key stages in the acquisition process. We
expect that since H.R. 2101 amended Title 10 moving the Preliminary Design Review
process prior to the Milestone B decision, that the technology maturity measurement will
also happen prior to Milestone B.
In the 1980’s acquisition reform focused on fraud, waste, and abuse. The Packard
Commission altered that trajectory to a focus on increasing the efficiency and
effectiveness of DOD acquisitions. Nevertheless, DOD acquisition programs still suffer
from cost and schedule overruns. We hope that through our assessment of the KAT we
can determine if programs that met the KP criteria as outlined by the GAO experienced
better program outcomes than programs that did not. We anticipate that the results of our
analysis will help DOD program managers better understand the effectiveness of the
KAT.
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Chapter III: Data Collection and Methodology

Data Source and Variables
We used acquisition program performance information for our analysis. We
collected this information from assessments that the Government Accountability Office
conducted and published. These reports documented acquisition-program performance
characteristics for high profile and large budget acquisition programs (GAO, 2008, p. 3).
The GAO performed these studies and published their reports annually from Calendar
Year 2003 through Calendar Year 2009, with each report covering an average of 55
programs.

We conducted approximately twenty random data point verifications to

validate the accuracy of our data.
We used the most recent iteration of each program found in the GAO reports for
our analysis. We used only the most current instance of each program to minimize the
intercorrelation of our predictor variables (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2004, p.
279). This yielded a sample size of 107 acquisition programs. Unfortunately, not all
programs had all of the appropriate data reducing the sample size further for some of our
tests. For example, there were 90 programs with complete data for KP1, 71 programs
with complete data for KP2, and 51 programs with complete data for KP3. Furthermore,
of the programs with complete data, only 11 programs had met the KP1 criteria, only 15
had met KP2 criteria, and only 4 programs had met KP3 criteria.
We used the program performance data that were contained in the GAO reports to
test our hypotheses. To recap, the GAO’s claim is that if a program meets the
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knowledge-point (KP) criteria at the predetermined junctures, the program will
experience better results than programs that did not meet the KP criteria. We considered
the knowledge points “treatments,” and compared the outcomes of the programs that met
the KP criteria with those that did not. We expected to find cost and schedule increases
to be smaller for programs that met the KP criteria, and we expected to find a smaller
reduction in the number of units produced for programs that met the KP criteria.

-

-

-

-

Where Group 0 did not meet KP criteria and Group 1 Met KP criteria
DVs/Outcomes measured: QCP

Where Group 0 did not meet KP criteria and Group 1 Met KP criteria
DVs/Outcomes measured: UCC, TCC, RDCC, SIP, PCC

Figure 4: Knowledge Point Attainment (GAO 2008)
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The GAO measured whether or not a program met KP1, KP2, and KP3 criteria at
the KAT’s predetermined knowledge points (Figure 4) in each report. We used these
KP1, KP2, and KP3 measurements as our independent variables. We gave each
independent variable an indicator of “0” if the program did not meet the KAT criteria on
time and gave a “1” to programs that did meet the KAT criteria on time.

Limitations of the Data
There are many factors external to the program office that can affect program
outcomes. For instance, unexpected changes to program requirements, volatile funding
sources, and unexpected schedule changes due to factors beyond the control of the
program office can disrupt program performance outcomes (GAO, Weapons Acquisition:
A Rare Opportunity for Lasting Change, 1992). These external factors may limit the
explanatory power of our models since they focused solely on whether a program met the
KP criteria (Deloitte Consulting LLP, 2008; Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2004, p.
74).
Our sample size of 107 programs was generally enough to assess whether a
statistically significant relationship existed between programs that met the KP criteria
versus those that did not (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2004). However, many
programs have not met the KP criteria on time. This limited the generalizeability of our
findings for other programs since such a small sample could contain atypical program
outcomes relative to the general program population (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008, p. 36).
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In addition, we have many more data points for KP1 than for KP2 or KP3 due to the time
series nature of our data. Many programs were not far enough along to have a
measurement for KP2 or KP3. The disparity in our data was reason for us to conduct
independent KP analysis so we could leverage the data points. If we had analyzed the
KP’s in combination, we would have eliminated many data points due to missing data.
In a few circumstances, we made assumptions based on the data available. Some
program assessments lacked information about whether a program met a given KP on
time. However, these reports did assess the programs current KP status. If a program did
not meet a KP as of the report date, and the report date was post KP measurement, we
assumed the program had not met the preceding KP criteria on time. Figure 5 exhibits
this scenario. This program did not have the data available regarding KP1, but it is
reasonable to assume that since they had not met the criteria in 2007 that they had not
met the criteria in 1995.

Figure 5: Data Deduction
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(GAO, 2008, p. 27)

The GAO did not randomly select the acquisition programs they followed
(Trochim & Donnelly, 2008, p. 38). However, our dataset contains a good mixture of the
different program types (Table 2). We consider these programs to be a good
representation of DOD acquisition programs and represent the environment in which the
GAO expects the KAT to apply.

Table 2: Data Demographics

Air
Space
Munition
Sea
Missile
MAIS
Land
Space/Air

Number of Programs Percent of Dataset
33
31%
15
14%
11
10%
15
14%
16
15%
14
13%
2
2%
1
1%

Dependent Variables
We collected the dependent variable (DV) information from the same GAO
reports that contained our independent variables. The information we gathered measured
specific program performance parameters such as schedule, cost and quantity change.
Since the GAO’s KAT associates KP completion with better acquisition program
outcomes, these variables provided a way for us to measure program performance. The
performance measures we used were Quantity Change Percent (QCP), Unit Cost Change
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(UCC), Total Cost Change (TCC), R&D Cost Change (RDCC), Schedule Increase
Percentage (SIP), and Procurement Cost Change (PCC) (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Program Performance with Respect to Program Baseline (GAO, 2008)

As previously mentioned, the GAO claimed that programs that met the KAT
criteria would experience better acquisition outcomes than programs that did not. Since
program sizes vary, we controlled for program size by using percentages. We expect
better performance to be evident through smaller percentage increases from a programs
baseline. We defined a better acquisition outcome to mean an outcome in which a
program performs at or below its program baseline, or to mean better performance with
respect to those programs that did not meet the KP criteria.
Dependent Variable Description
The first Dependent Variable (Table 3) we used was Schedule Increase Percent
(SIP), this variable measured program schedule change with respect to a program’s
baseline. To test the KAT claim, we tested whether programs that met the KP criteria
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performed better than those programs that did not meet the KP criteria. Better
performance would be indicated by a smaller percent schedule change.
The next Dependent Variable we used was Quantity Change Percent (QCP).
This variable measured the percentage change in a program’s anticipated production
quantity relative to the number the program expected to produce at its baseline date. We
reasoned that managers at risk of exceeding their budgets might need to reduce their
production quantities in order to stay within budget. Therefore, we expect that for this
variable, smaller quantity reductions indicate better program outcomes. The exception to
this would be if quantities increased due to mission need, regardless of poor unit cost
performance. We had 19 programs in our dataset that had not met any KP criteria they
were accountable for, but had an increase in QCP nevertheless. Of these programs, there
were ten programs that missed the KP criteria and experienced significant unit cost
growth, and yet these programs increased the number of units they produced. This
behavior leads us to question the degree to which QCP is a good metric for “good”
acquisition programs. Consequently, we rely less on this variable than some of our other
variables which we think are more highly correlated with successful acquisition
programs.
In addition to quantity change, we looked at the change in unit cost, UCC. We
tested to see if programs that met the KP criteria had a smaller unit cost percent change
than programs that did not meet the KP criteria. We collected all unit cost change
amounts in percent change relative to their estimated cost on the program baseline date.
We also looked at Total Program Cost Change, TCC, to determine if a program’s
total cost change was smaller for programs that met the KP criteria than for programs that
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did not. Since the three KP’s focus on different types of knowledge and are at different
points in the program lifecycle, it is reasonable to assume that they may affect particular
components of a program more than others. TCC should allow us to see the total
financial effect the KPs have on a program as opposed to growth in one particular area.
Procurement Unit Cost is the cost to purchase a unit (its piece/parts and assembly
cost) whereas a program’s unit cost is unit cost as a function of total program costs (Total
cost/number of units). We used the Procurement Unit Cost Change, PCC, to determine if
programs that met the KP criteria had a smaller increase in procurement costs relative to
programs that did not meet the KP criteria.
Our last variable, Research and Development Cost Change, RDCC, measured a
program’s R&D cost change in percentage terms. We expected that programs that did
not have mature technology and an understanding of product design would experience
research and development cost growth.
The GAO’s KAT states that programs that meet the KP criteria on time will
experience better outcomes. We used the variables UCC, PCC, TCC, RDCC, SIP, and
QCP as our measures of program performance.
The GAO described the KAT as a sequential process and that in order to meet
either KP2 or KP3 a program would need to have met the preceding KP(s) (GAO, 2004,
pp. 4-5). It is reasonable to assume that a program will be more likely to achieve either
KP2 or KP3 if it has achieved the KPs that precede it. However, we found that eleven
programs in the reports had met KP2 criteria without meeting KP1 criteria. In addition,
since each KP was measured using criteria unique to that KP and because each KP
measurement is independent of the other KPs, we examined each KP individually.

43

Methodology
The primary purpose of our study was to test the GAO’s KAT by determining if a
difference existed between the outcomes of two groups, those that have met KP criteria
and those that have not. We compared programs that met KP1, KP2, and KP3 with
programs that did not to see if programs that met the criteria performed better. We
conducted Independent-Sample T-Tests to determine if the mean performance of the
programs that met the KP criteria was better than the mean performance of the programs
that did not (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2004, pp. 1309-1310). We used this
methodology instead of an ANOVA because our research question involves one-way or
directional hypotheses, which indicate that F tests are inappropriate. T-Tests are an
appropriate method for determining if the mean of the group that failed to meet KP1
(coded as KP1=0) is “worse” than the mean of the group that achieved KP1, where
“worse” may be greater or lesser depending on the particular metric (Kutner, Nachtsheim,
Neter, & Li, 2004, p. 1310).
Our primary statistical test was the standard T test with pooled variance (Bulmer,
1979, pp. 145-154; McClave, Benson, & Sincich, 2008). One of the assumptions of this
test is that both groups have the same variance. To test this assumption we conducted the
Levene Test and examined the corresponding P-Value (McClave, Benson, & Sincich,
2008, p. 455). In cases where this P-value was less than 0.05, we concluded that the
variances were statistically different and consequently the standard T test was
inappropriate. In these cases, we instead used the Welch Test since it accounts for
different variances between the groups (Montgomery, 1999, p. 392). In either case
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(standard T test or Welch test), we examined the resulting P-value to find significant
relationships.
Table 3: Variable List

Description

Nomenclature

Measured the schedule increase relative to the
Program’s Baseline Date (Percentage)

SIP

Dependent
Variables
Schedule Increase
Percent
Quantity Change
Percent
Unit Cost Change
Percent
Total Cost Change
Percent
Procurement Cost
Change Percent
Research &
Development Cost
Change
Independent
Variables

Measured an increase/decrease in production
units relative to the Program’s Baseline Date
(Percentage)
Measured the change in cost of each
production unit relative to the Program’s
Baseline Date (Percentage)
Measured the change in the total cost of a
program relative to the Program’s Baseline
Date (Percentage)
Measured the change in Procurement Costs
relative to the Program’s Baseline Date
(Percentage)
Measured the change in Research and
Development costs relative to the Program’s
Baseline Date (Percentage)

Measured whether a program had mature
Knowledge Point 1 technology (Technology Readiness Level 7)
by program initiation (Milestone B)
Measured whether a program had 90% of its
Knowledge Point 2 engineering drawings by Critical Design
Review
Measured whether a program’s manufacturing
Knowledge Point 3 processes were in statistical control by
Milestone C
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QCP

UCC

TCC

PCC

RDCC

KP1

KP2

KP3

Distribution of Variables
In addition to testing the relationships between meeting KP criteria and program
performance, we looked at the distribution of our variables. We visually examined the
distribution to see if programs that met the KP criteria experienced a more tightly
distributed range of outcomes than programs that did not meet. In other words, though
programs may not have different mean outcomes with respect to meeting KP criteria,
programs that meet the KP criteria may have a smaller deviation from the mean than
programs that did not meet the KP criteria (Figures 8 - 10).
Finally, we looked at the effects of the KAT on programs by type of program. For
example, we wanted to see if a program’s product had any correlation to whether it met
the KP criteria or if the KAT was more effective on certain types of products. Our sample
size was too small for statistical analysis so we conducted a visual analysis of the data for
this measurement.

Controlling for Program Age
We supplemented our t-tests with an additional model to see if a program’s age
influenced our results. One of the features of our data is that GAO’s program
performance measurements occurred at different points in the program’s lifecycles. For
example, the GAO measured some programs shortly after the program reached a
Knowledge Point, while in other cases, the GAO’s measurement occurred many years
after a program had reached a Knowledge Point. This meant that some programs had
much more time to incur cost, schedule, and quantity change than other programs and
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consequently, we concluded that by adding AGE into our model we could control for
these differences and increase the fidelity of the relationships.
We used the program initiation date (Milestone B) and the date of the GAO’s
measurement to determine the approximate number of days a program had existed
(AGE). We then retested our hypothesis using linear regression models in lieu of t-tests
to accommodate our control variable. The model chosen was a straightforward bivariate
regression model of the form:

Y Variables: UCC, QCP, PCC, SIP, TCC, RDCC; Error Term:

In the course of fitting these regression models, we conducted reasonable
regression diagnostics in order to check the assumptions of ordinary least-squares (OLS)
regression, which is zero-mean, independent, constant variance error terms, as well as
checks for multicolinearity and influential points (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li,
2004, pp. 102-103). The results of these diagnostics implied non-constant variance, so in
response we utilized the standard technique of transforming the Y
variable

. In most cases, a

simple natural logarithm transform was sufficient to remedy the non-constant variance,
although for RDDC and TCC, Box-Cox analysis showed that a power transform with
appeared more appropriate. In all cases, we were able to develop a model that
appeared to satisfy the assumptions of OLS.
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Chapter IV: Analysis and Results
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics of our variables. We found that
missing the KP criteria did not have a pervasive impact on our dependent variables.
Some dependent variables showed improvement when programs met the KPs, but most
dependent variables did not. However, we were still able to find some important
relationships between programs meeting the KP’s and better program performance.
Additionally, we assessed whether program type had an effect on a program’s
performance or a program’s likeliness to meet the KP criteria. We could not test our
conclusions statistically, but still found the results relevant to this study.

Test of Hypotheses
The results of our analyses are in Table 5. Through our analysis of these
programs, we found a few significant relationships. First, we found that Research and
Development Cost Change related closely to KP1. Programs that had mature technology
at or prior to Milestone B had a smaller increase in Research and Development costs than
programs that had immature technology at Milestone B. This confirms our expectation
that RDCC is a good measure of program performance, specifically, with respect to KP1.
Furthermore, we presume that programs with immature technology have a higher rate of
Research and Development funding cost growth since technology maturation must occur
as the program moves past Milestone B.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (one-tailed)

2. KP2

1. KP1

STDV

Mean

Correlation Matrix

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)

1

2

3

4

5

1.00

.961**

.946**

-0.07

.293**

0.00

0.00

0.30

0.01

69

42

54

1.00

**

0.00
42

1.19

N

91

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)

1.79

N

72

3. KP3

Pearson Correlation

1.00
0.61

Sig. (1-tailed)

52

0.26

7. TCC
8. RDCC

Pearson Correlation

Pearson Correlation

0.48

-0.05

0.07

0.34

67

65

72

73

65

-0.01

*

.237

-0.21

-0.13

-0.17

-0.09

0.47

0.04

0.07

0.17

0.10

0.26

44

55

54

59

59

53

-0.15

**

*

-.258

-0.06

-0.04

-0.09

0.05

0.36

0.39

0.29

.385

0.01

34

43

42

44

44

40

1.00

0.10

.523**

.331**

.337**

.242*

0.22

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.02

66

66

67

67

66

1.00

**

**

**

.867**

0.00

0.00

-.268

0.98

.542

0.00

.481

79

81

81

78

1.00

0.14

0.10

0.00

0.10

0.18

0.49

79

79

76

1.00

.822**

.954**

86

0.00
86

0.00
79

1.00

.716**

0.95
79

0.52

1.17

4.16

0.00

N

Sig. (1-tailed)
N

-0.17

0.24

81

Sig. (1-tailed)
N

Sig. (1-tailed)

-0.09

0.05

0.01

N
Pearson Correlation

-0.20

1.51

N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)

9

67

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)

8

0.50

N

9. PCC

6. UCC

5. QCP

4. SIP

Pearson Correlation
0.29

7

0.20

N

Sig. (1-tailed)

.948

6

87

79
1.00

0.53

1.27
79

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
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In addition to RDCC, we found that the Unit Cost Change (UCC) for programs
that did not meet the KP criteria increased more than for those programs that met the KP
criteria. In retrospect, we find that UCC is an important variable since the cost of each
unit is a function of several other variables (Figure 7). We find UCC to be more
important than any other variable because it is affected when any cost or quantity variable
changes. Unit Cost Change is a sensitive variable encompassing many program changes.
Our finding was confirmed given that this variable had a significant relationship with
more independent variables than any other dependent variable. We found that KP1, and
KP3, related closely to Unit Cost Change and that KP2 had a tenuous relationship.
Lastly, we could not prove that if a program met the KP criteria it would
experience a smaller schedule increase than if it did not meet the KP criteria. This
finding was interesting, because it seems counterintuitive. We expected to find that
programs that missed the KP criteria would experience larger schedule increases than
programs that met the KP criteria. Specifically, we expected programs that missed KP1
or KP2 to have larger schedule increases since still needed to mature their technologies
and complete their product designs.

Figure 7: Unit Cost Function
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Table 5: Results of Analyses
Hypothesis 1
(KP1)

Hypotheses 2
(KP2)

Hypothesis 3
(KP3)

SIP

0.298

0.468

0.197

QCP

0.145

0.180

0.205

UCC

0.054*

0.066*

0.049**

TCC

0.236

0.172

0.360

RDCC

0.001**

0.104

0.390

PCC

0.339

0.256

0.294

* < .1
** <.05
*** <.01

†

†

†

†

†Welch Test: Unequal Variances

The results of our t-tests indicate that if a program manager adheres to the KAT
they will reduce their unit cost growth. As mentioned earlier we did not find significance
with many variables. However, we believe that we could not find significance with PCC,
TCC, SIP, and QCP because of the inherent variability of acquisition programs, with
other uncontrolled factors making a true effect. . Nevertheless, we found UCC to be the
most important variable for determining better program performance. Unit Cost changes
when any of the other variables change. Furthermore, we propose that UCC is a better
measurement of program performance because of this transparency and because it can be
easily compared among programs of different types. For example, a satellite program
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may have a large R&D cost relative to its Procurement costs while a dumb munition that
is mass-produced, may have a much larger Procurement cost relative to its R&D costs.
This can make R&D or Procurement cost growth hard to compare among programs.

Decreased Variability
In most cases, the cost, schedule, and quantity change for programs that met the
KAT criteria varied less than for programs that did not. Figure 8 through Figure 10 show
the range of outcomes for each variable with respect to the Knowledge Points (0 =
Missed KP; 1 = Met KP). In many cases, programs did not experience better results by
meeting the KP criteria. However, some programs that met the KP criteria appeared to
experience decreased variability. A double-asterisk, in the following figures, indicates
the groups with statistically different variances according to the results of the Levene test
for equal variance. This decrease in variability may be significant because inspection of
the data seems to suggest that the distribution of outcomes has a heavy tail in the negative
(or “bad”) direction. Thus, meeting KP criteria might reduce the probability of a program
performing really badly.

Controlling for Program Age
Table 6 displays the results of our alternative model, which controlled for
program age. First, we found that the relationship between RDCC and KP1 weakened.
We did not find that programs that missed KP1 experienced higher Research and
Development Costs when we controlled for age. However, we found a marginal
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relationship between Research and Development Cost increases and programs that
missed KP2. While we cannot explain this with certainty why this occurs, we do note
that KP2 measurement involves a near complete product design, and hence it makes
sense that programs that did not have a clear understanding of their product as they
approached production experienced more cost growth. This could also explain why KP1
was not significant after we controlled for age. Milestone B could be too early in the
acquisition cycle to be a reliable estimate of R&D cost growth. Programs that meet KP1
criteria may begin with an advantage, but it may be that the advantage dissipates with
time due to factors exogenous to the program office.

Table 6: Results of Analysis, Controlling for Age

KP1

KP2

KP3

SIP

0.490

0.239

0.485

QCP

0.016**

0.105**

0.028**

UCC

0.003***

0.011**

0.022**

TCC

0.233

0.159

0.384

RDCC

0.135

0.096*

0.282

PCC

0.337

0.192

0.289

* < .1
** <.05
*** <.01

53

Second, we found that the relationship between programs that met the KP criteria
and lower unit cost growth increased substantially. Our previous tests indicated a
marginal relationship, but when we controlled for AGE the relationship became
significant for all of the independent variables. Furthermore, Quantity change became
significant with respect to KP1 and KP2. In other words, programs that met KP1 and
KP2 experienced a smaller reduction in quantities than programs that did not meet these
Knowledge Points. Naturally, programs have more opportunity to experience cost and
schedule changes as they age. By controlling for age, we were able to account for this
artifact and get a clearer understanding of how the KP criteria relate to unit cost and
quantity change. In other words, we could determine if the cost and quantity changes
correlated to meeting the Knowledge-Points, and we could eliminate the possibility that
those relationships were simply a function of a program’s age.

54

Figure 8: KP1 versus DV's
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Figure 9: KP2 versus DV's
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Figure 10: KP3 versus DV's
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Next, we organized the programs in our dataset into categories. We looked to see
if any trends existed among the program types. Two program types, Land and Space/Air,
contained only one data point so we could not obtain any trends from those groups. Of
the groups we could assess, we found that Munition programs were much more likely to
meet KP1 criteria than any other program type. Additionally, we found that Space
programs and Missile programs met KP2 criteria more than any other program type. We
found that KP3 was the most frequently missed KP; only 7.8% of the programs assessed
at KP3 had production processes in statistical control.
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KP Accomplishment by Program Type
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# of Programs
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20
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Figure 11: KP accomplishment by program type

Lastly, we analyzed whether the KAT was more influential on one program type
than another was (Appendix B). We expected that meeting the KP criteria would have a
smaller affect on certain program types for a couple of reasons. First, the outcomes of
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high profile programs may be influenced more by politically driven decisions than by
program execution decisions. Second, simpler programs may have fewer uncertainties
remaining after KP completion providing for a better chance at improved outcomes. Our
sample size was reduced significantly when we categorized our variables by program
type. This limited the conclusions we could draw from the data. The output of our
analysis is in Appendix B. Generally, all program types appeared to be affected
relatively similarly. However, because there are more data points for programs missing
the KP criteria than meeting the criteria we could not make any certain claims. The
decreased variability and better outcomes may have been due to chance, or may have
been an artifact of the smaller sample size.
Lastly, it is important to note that the programs that met the KPs had certain
characteristics in common. For instance, not many Air programs met the KnowledgePoints. However, Air programs that met the KPs were older programs that were being
upgraded, or in the case of the Light Utility Helicopter, a commercial-of-the-shelf
product. Furthermore, we found that the preponderance of programs that met the
Knowledge-Points were in either the missile or munition category. These programs are
by no means simple, however they are much less complicated than an Airframe or Space
system.
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Chapter V: Conclusions

The GAO has championed the Knowledge-Based Acquisition Theory for years.
Their claim has been that when programs have mature technology, a complete product
design, and mature production processes, they will experience better results. Our thesis
focused on validating the GAO’s claim in order to further the acquisition community of
practice. In many ways, our study validated the GAO’s claim. However, we also found
that the KAT is not a comprehensive means to program success. There are other factors
not captured in the KAT that contribute to program success.
We could not find a significant relationship between KP1, KP2, or KP3, and
PCC, SIP, or TCC performance. We believe that this is because acquisition programs are
unique and will not all be affected the same when a program misses KP1, KP2, or KP3
criteria. However, we did observe that when a program missed the KP criteria its
outcome varied much more wildly than programs that had met the KP criteria.
Additionally, we observed that the KAT correlated considerably with improved
unit cost change performance. In retrospect, we believe that the UCC variable is the most
suitable measurement of success of all the variables because it encompasses several
program measurement components. Unit cost changes in any program when either a
dollar or a quantity component changes (unless cost and quantity change
proportionately). Furthermore, since UCC was a significant variable for all KP’s with the
alternative model, we feel its correlation validated the GAO’s KAT as an effective
approach for better program outcomes.
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Limitations
Some limitations of our study warrant future research. First, our sample size was
limited. As of this study, the GAO had only been tracking KP achievement for seven
years (2003 – 2009) limiting our analysis to a combined 107 programs, and some of these
programs had only partial data. To date, relatively few programs have met the KP
criteria, giving us unequal sample sizes. More programs missed the KP criteria than met
them. Additionally, we had fewer data points for KP2 than for KP1, similarly, we had
fewer data points for KP3 than for KP2. Our dataset only contained four programs that
met KP3 criteria preventing us from conducting a rigorous analysis of the correlation
between KP3 criteria and better program outcomes. This study would benefit from a
retest of the hypothesis when more data points are available.
There were limitations to the conclusions we made. We did not have the right
kind of data (e.g. experimental) to test for causality. Future researchers can use both the
data provided by the GAO and annual program data from the Selected Acquisition
Reports to see if program cost and schedule performance was altered once a program met
the KP criteria.

In addition, we could only show that program outcomes were in general

correlated to the KP criteria. We could not determine if certain types of programs were
more strongly correlated than others. A larger sample of programs may show that the
KAT is only applicable to specific program types.
Lastly, while it appears that programs have been reluctant to adopt the GAO’s
Knowledge-Based Approach, it may be that the approach must be adapted to the DOD
acquisition environment. Department of Defense programs are by nature innovative and
cutting edge, thus bearing a higher degree of uncertainty and risk than commercial
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programs (Friedman, 2009). The DOD program managers are often not afforded the time
and resources needed to obtain the same knowledge of their program as commercial
program managers. It may be unjust to compare DOD program outcomes to the
outcomes of Commercial firms; given that DOD program managers are expected to
manage much more complicated and risky programs. However, if DOD program
outcomes are expected to measure up to commercial outcomes, the DOD should consider
altering its practices to compare to the best commercial practices (e.g. GAO’s KAT).

Impact to the Acquisition Community
The results of this analysis should influence the decisions made by the acquisition
community. We have validated that adhering to the GAO’s KAT is an effective way of
improving acquisition results. Furthermore, we can interpret that adhering to the KAT
can help program’s produce their products more closely to the originally estimated cost.
The GAO’s Knowledge-Based Approach can help program managers deliver capabilities
to the warfighter more closely to their original cost and schedule estimates.
Additionally, the GAO’s findings should provide program managers with a
substantial reason to freeze requirements early, and to use mature technology. If they can
avoid requirements creep and developing technology past Milestone B, they can improve
their program outcomes. Ultimately, the warfighter benefits most, because they will get
their products quicker and closer to the original cost estimate.
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Conclusion
The language contained in the Weapon System Reform Act of 2009 supports the
GAO’s KAT by placing emphasis on using mature technology and conducting trade-offs
between cost, schedule, and performance (111-23, 2009). We validated the GAO’s KAT
as a useful means of achieving better program results, but we were unable to validate it as
a comprehensive means to better program performance. In our opinion, the KnowledgeBased Acquisition Theory is appropriate for DOD programs; it can help them experience
better results. However, we also acknowledge that in some cases it may require limiting
a product’s capability or slowing down the fielding or a product beyond the user’s
tolerance level. For instance, Quick Reaction Capabilities may not be suited for the KAT.
Where applicable, the GAO’s Knowledge-Based Acquisition Theory can help programs
experience better results.
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Appendix A: Technology Readiness Level’s
(GAO, 2009, pp. 174-175)
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Appendix B: Summary of KP achievement by Program Type and Dependent
Variable
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